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of the Department of National Security Affairs (NSA) and specializes in the study of 
international relations, security policy, and regional studies. One of the CCC’s 
programs is the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD 
(PASCC). PASCC operates as a program planning and implementation office, research 
center, and intellectual clearinghouse for the execution of analysis and future-oriented 
studies and dialogues for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. 
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Introduction A	   workshop	   on	   global	   and	   regional	   security	   was	   held	   in	   Brasilia	   on	   13	   and	   14	  August,	  2012.	  This	  event	  was	  supported	  and	  executed	  by	  the	  Project	  on	  Advanced	  Systems	  and	  Concepts	  for	  Countering	  WMD	  (PASCC)	  of	  the	  Center	  on	  Contemporary	  Conflict	  at	  the	  Naval	  Postgraduate	  School.	  PASCC	  is	  sponsored	  by	  the	  Defense	  Threat	  Reduction	  Agency.	  The	   participants	   included	   9	   Brazilian	   and	   7	   U.S.	   specialists	   in	   security,	   global	  proliferation,	  disarmament,	  and	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  policies.	  Also	  present	  were	  observers	   from	   the	   Brazilian	   Presidency’s	   Secretariat	   for	   Strategic	   Affairs,	   the	   Defense	  Threat	  Reduction	  Agency,	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  Embassy	  in	  Brasilia.	  
Brazil’s Position in the Region Brazilian	   participants	   emphasized	   early	   on	   in	   the	   discussions	   that	   Brazil	   faces	   no	  regional	   adversaries.	   This	   allows	   them	   the	  maximum	   latitude	   to	   engage	   in	   international	  politics	  at	   the	   time	  and	  place	  of	   their	   choosing	  at	   low	  risk	  and	  cost.	  They	  noted	   that	   this	  differentiates	  them	  from	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  BRIC	  category	  (Brazil,	  Russia,	  India,	  China).	  They	  also	  candidly	  admitted	  that	  this	  provides	  many	  opportunities	  to	  ‘free	  ride’	  on	  global	  security	  issues.	  They	  then	  reminded	  the	  group	  that	  Brazil	  is	  the	  only	  BRIC	  without	  nuclear	  weapons.	  	  A	  Brazilian	  participant	  explained	  that	  for	  150	  years	  concern	  for	  the	  regional	  balance	  of	  power	  dictated	  Brazil’s	  foreign	  policy.	  During	  this	  time,	  there	  was	  a	  fear	  that	  if	  Brazil	  had	  an	   activist	   policy	   in	   South	   America,	   then	   its	   South	   American	   neighbors	   would	   balance	  against	   it.	   That	   rationale	   died	   away	   as	   Argentina	   started	   to	   collapse	   in	   the	   1960s	   and	  further	  collapsed	  in	  1982,	  as	  explained	  by	  this	  participant.	  From	  that	  moment	  onward,	  the	  dominant	  policy	  view	  was	  that	  neighbors	  would	  support	  an	  increasingly	  powerful	  Brazil.	  Some	   Brazilian	   participants	   downplayed	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   Organization	   of	  American	   States	   in	   enhancing	   regional	   security.	   They	   identified	   the	   Union	   of	   South	  American	  Nations	  (UNASUR)	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  regional	   institution	  better	   fit	   for	  Brazil’s	  preferred	  approach	   to	   leadership	  with	   the	  principle	  of	   dialogue	  and	  discussion	  based	  on	  mutual	   respect.	   However,	   one	   of	   the	   Brazilian	   participants	   pointed	   to	   the	   recent	  suspension	   of	   Paraguay	   from	   	  MERCOSUR	   (Common	  Market	   of	   the	   South)	   following	   the	  impeachment	   of	   President	   Lugo	   and	   the	   subsequent	   incorporation	   of	   Venezuela	   	   as	  examples	   	   of	   Brazilian	   ‘realpolitik’	   that	   belie	   the	   stated	   preference	   for	   dialogue	   among	  equals.	  A	  Brazilian	  participant	  added	   that	   regardless	  of	  whether	   the	   region	   is	   inclined	   to	  facilitate	   or	   inhibit	   Brazil’s	   ambitions,	   Brazil	   needs	   to	  work	   to	  win	   the	   region’s	   support.	  Brazil	  has	  become	  even	  more	   important	   in	  economic	  and	  political	   terms	  due	   to	  mistakes	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made	  by	  its	  neighbors.	  One	  participant	  contended	  that	  U.S.	  neglect	  of	  South	  America	  could	  present	  an	  opportunity	  for	  Brazil	  to	  gain	  more	  power	  in	  the	  region.	   	  Brazilian	   participants	   also	   noted	   the	   particular	   alignment	   of	   domestic	  	  	  constituencies	   regarding	   issues	   such	   as	   MERCOSUR	   and	   UNASUR,	   which	   they	   saw	   as	  demonstrating	  that	  Brazil	  was	  a	  consolidated	  democracy	  that	  had	  to	  respond	  to	  domestic	  political	  and	  economic	  interests	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  that	  the	  United	  States	  government	  did.	  The	  United	  States	  and	  Brazil	  also	  look	  very	  similar	  in	  their	  relationship	  with	  the	  region,	  one	  participant	  said.	  If	  we	  actually	  look	  at	  the	  interests	  of	  United	  States	  and	  Brazil,	  they	  are	  very	  convergent.	  One	  Brazilian	  participant	  also	  added	  that,	  like	  the	  United	  States,	  Brazil	  is	  happy	  to	  retreat	  back	  to	  unilateralism.	  	  Brazilian	   participants	   repeatedly	   emphasized	   that	   Brazil	   is	   uniquely	   qualified	   to	  play	  the	  role	  of	   international	  peacemaker	  due	  to	  their	  peaceful	   traditions,	   the	  strength	  of	  their	   diplomacy,	   and	   their	   experience	   in	   reducing	   tensions	   during	   international	   crises.	  Brazilians	  also	  stressed	  that	  as	  a	  consolidated	  free	  market	  democracy,	  Brazil	  is	  inherently	  a	  responsible	  power	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  They	  disagreed	  with	  the	  characterization	  of	  Brazil	  as	  a	  ‘spoiler’,	  a	  position	  held	  by	  some	  U.S.	  observers	  of	  global	  nonproliferation	  efforts	  (albeit	  not	  by	  the	  U.S.	  participants	  in	  this	  dialogue).	  Again	  and	  again	  Brazilian	  participants	  emphasized	   their	   responsible	   and	   mature	   behavior	   in	   important	   international	   issues,	  including	  nuclear	  ones.	  	  The	  dialogue	  participants	  from	  outside	  of	  the	  region	  agreed	  that	  Brazil	  has	  acquired	  a	  good	  reputation	  for	  its	  skilled	  diplomacy.	  One	  U.S.	  participant	  predicted	  that	  Brazil	  would	  eventually	  join	  the	  expanded	  UN	  Security	  Council	  as	  a	  permanent	  member.	  
Limits to the NPT The	  Brazilians	  considered	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Brazil	  to	  be	  natural	  partners	  in	  international	  nonproliferation	   efforts,	   and	   both	   sides	   agreed	   that	   the	   international	   nonproliferation	  regime	   was	   in	   crisis.	   They	   offered	   different	   explanations,	   however,	   for	   the	   roots	   of	   the	  regime	  crisis.	  A	  participant	   from	  within	  the	  region	  added	  that	   it	   is	  difficult	   for	  Brazil	  and	  the	  U.S.	   to	  be	  on	   the	  same	  page	  or	  even	  debate	  nuclear	   issues	  because	   the	   two	  countries	  comes	  from	  very	  different	  ends	  of	  the	  nuclear	  spectrum.	  Participants	  observed	  that	  the	  NPT	  regime	  is	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  legitimacy	  crisis.	  One	  participant	  said	  that	   from	  an	  institutional	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  original	  design	  of	  the	  regime	  left	  it	  unable	  to	  adapt	  to	  changes	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  the	  international	  system	  since	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Some	  U.S.	  participants	  expressed	  optimism	  that	  the	  NPT	  has	  been	  bolstered	  by	  the	  Obama	  administration’s	  support	  for	  the	  NPT.	  A	  change	  in	  both	  attitude	  and	  policy	  from	  the	  administration	  has	   fostered	  a	  new	  sense	  of	  hope	   in	   the	  NPT’s	  utility.	  This	  participant	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added	  that	  only	  by	  fully	  engaging	  other	  members	  of	  the	  NPT	  can	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Brazil	  hope	  to	  make	  the	  non-­‐proliferation	  regime	  stronger.	  As	   part	   of	   their	   critique	   of	   the	   existing	   nonproliferation	   regime,	   Brazilian	  participants	   remarked	   that	   U.S.	   policy	   towards	   India	   and	   Israel	   rewarded	   bad	   behavior,	  while	  states	  that	  had	  complied	  with	  the	  NPT,	  such	  as	  Brazil,	  were	  ignored.	  They	  also	  raised	  questions	  on	  U.S.	  policy	  towards	  Iran	  since	  they	  believed	  that,	  circumstances	  aside,	  some	  of	  the	  criticisms	  leveled	  at	  Iran	  could	  be	  used	  in	  the	  future	  to	  target	  Brazil’s	  nuclear	  program.	  U.S.	   participants	   observed	   that	   there	  was	   a	   considerable	   difference	   between	   the	   various	  cases.	   They	   pointed	   out	   that	   Iran	   (and	   North	   Korea)	   had	   violated	   treaty	   commitments	  under	  the	  NPT,	  and	  this	  justified	  the	  measures	  taken	  by	  the	  international	  community	  and	  the	  United	  States	  to	  bring	  them	  back	  into	  compliance.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Israel	  and	  India	  had	  not	   signed	   the	  NPT,	   so	  while	   their	   role	   in	  nuclear	  proliferation	  might	  be	  regrettable,	  they	  were	  not	  guilty	  of	  treaty	  violations.	  The	  Brazilian	  participants	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  it	  was	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  Brazil	  would	  sign	  an	  Additional	  Protocol	   (AP)	   to	   the	  NPT.	  They	  repeatedly	  stressed	  Brazil’s	  principled	  opposition	  to	  the	  discriminatory	  nature	  of	  the	  NPT	  and	  the	  need	  to	  make	  further	  progress	  on	  disarmament.	  Some	  Brazilian	  participants	  considered	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  NPT	  in	  1998	  to	  be	  a	  mistake	  because	  Brazil	  had	  gained	   little	   from	  it,	  while	  countries	   that	  had	  not	  signed	  the	  NPT—India	  and	   Israel—had	  received	  assistance	   from	  the	  United	  States.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   one	   of	   the	   Brazilian	   participants	   observed	   that	   Brazil	   aspired	   to	   join	   another	  discriminatory	   international	   regime,	  permanent	  membership	  on	   the	  UN	  Security	  Council,	  so	  clearly	  its	  stand	  was	  not	  consistent.	  The	  Brazilian	  participants	  took	  great	  pride	  in	  their	  country’s	  history	  of	   implementing	  safeguards	   through	  the	  Brazilian-­‐Argentine	  Agency	   for	  Accounting	   and	  Control	   of	  Nuclear	  Materials	   (ABACC)	   and	   the	   transparency	  provided	  by	  concluding	   the	   Quadripartite	   Safeguards	   Agreement	   (QSA)	   among	   Argentina,	   Brazil,	  ABACC,	  and	  the	  International	  Atomic	  Energy	  Agency	  (IAEA).	  	  Additionally,	  there	  was	  some	  discussion	  as	  to	  whether	  a	  set	  of	  amendments	  to	  Brazil	  and	  Argentina’s	  existing	  safeguards	  agreement	  might	  be	   functionally	  equivalent	  to	  an	  AP	  and	  break	  the	   impasse	  over	  Brazil’s	  refusal	  to	  sign.	  	  A	   participant	   from	   inside	   the	   region	   insisted	   that	   the	   role	   of	   the	  NPT	   in	   the	   non-­‐proliferation	   regime	   should	   not	   be	   overemphasized.	   Other	   actions	   could	   reinforce	   the	  regime	  without	   the	  NPT.	   From	   its	   inception,	   the	   participant	   contended,	   the	  NPT	   has	   not	  been	   a	   specific	   disarmament	   treaty.	   Different	   actions	   and	   instruments	   could	   be	   more	  effective	  and	  accurate	  in	  advancing	  nuclear	  disarmament.	  If	  the	  true	  intention	  is	  to	  achieve	  global	  nuclear	  disarmament,	  then	  the	  regime	  needs	  to	  explore	  more	  options.	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Criticism of U.S. Policy and Perceived Intentions Some	  Brazilian	  participants	  revealed	  that	  there	  is	  a	  perception	  of	  the	  United	  States	  as	   not	   sufficiently	   trustworthy	   to	   encourage	   significant	   global	   change	   regarding	   non-­‐proliferation	  and	  disarmament	  in	  the	  international	  system.	  More	  specifically,	  a	  participant	  said	  that	  there	  is	  a	  view	  that	  the	  United	  States	  only	  promotes	  nuclear	  disarmament	  because	  of	  its	  overwhelming	  advantage	  over	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  in	  terms	  of	  conventional	  military	  weapons.	   The	   presence	   of	   these	   views	   demonstrated	   the	   need	   for	   a	   greater	   fostering	   of	  trust	   in	   order	   to	   conduct	   successful	   negotiations	   on	   nuclear	   non-­‐proliferation	   and	  disarmament	   issues.	   It	  was	  argued	  that	  despite	  some	  skepticism,	  the	  United	  States	   is	  still	  the	  right	  actor	  to	  push	  these	  negotiations.	  The	   Brazilian	   participants	   were	   highly	   critical	   of	   the	   U.S.	   reaction	   to	   the	   2010	  Tehran	   declaration	   announcing	   a	   Brazil-­‐Turkey-­‐Iran	   initiative	   to	   conduct	   a	   nuclear	   fuel	  swap.	   The	   Brazilians	   felt	   that	   President	   da	   Silva	   had	   acted	   with	   the	   tacit	   support	   and	  encouragement	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  only	  to	  have	  the	  rug	  pulled	  out	  from	  under	  him	  after	  he	   announced	   the	   deal.	   They	   believed	   that	   it	   would	   be	   a	   long	   time	   before	   Brazil	   would	  cooperate	   with	   the	   United	   States	   in	   this	   way	   again.	   However,	   one	   of	   the	   Brazilian	  participants	   noted	   that	   the	   Tehran	   declaration	   reflected	   shortcomings	   in	   the	   technical	  knowledge	  of	  Brazilian	  diplomats	  on	  nuclear	  issues.	  
Security Threats and Changes in the International System  There	   was	   considerable	   discussion	   during	   the	   workshop	   of	   Brazil’s	   perceived	  security	   threats.	   In	  general,	   the	  Brazilian	  description	  of	  possible	   threats	  was	  quite	  vague,	  focused	  very	  much	  on	  the	  future	  rather	  than	  the	  present.	  Rather	  than	  ‘naming’	  threats,	  the	  Brazilians	  preferred	  a	  capabilities-­‐based	  approach	  to	  defense	  planning.	  	  	  When	   pressed	   by	   some	   of	   the	   U.S.	   participants	   to	   be	   concrete,	   several	   Brazilian	  participants	  noted	  that	  Brazil	  and	  South	  America	  were	  rich	  in	  minerals,	  energy,	  water	  and	  agricultural	  lands,	  and	  that	  this	  could	  pose	  a	  temptation	  to	  outside	  powers	  at	  some	  point	  in	  the	  future	  when	  global	  scarcity	  became	  the	  norm.	  They	  argued	  that	  Brazil’s	  frontiers	  were	  extensive	   (over	  16,000	  kilometers),	   crossed	  difficult	   terrain,	   and	  were	  porous.	  They	   also	  observed	   that	   Brazil’s	   extensive	  maritime	   frontier	  was	   critical	   to	   national	  wellbeing	   and	  stressed	   the	   need	   to	   protect	   the	   “Blue	   Amazon,”	   the	   area	   which	   houses	   the	   Brazilian	  Exclusive	  Economic	  Zone	  and	  Continental	  Shelf.	   	  The	  most	  concrete	  example	  of	  a	  possible	  threat	   offered	   by	   a	   Brazilian	   participant	   was	   that	   of	   an	   invading	   naval	   task	   force.	   The	  Falklands-­‐Malvinas	   conflict	  was	   offered	   as	   an	   example	   of	   how	   the	   security	   environment	  could	  change	  quickly	  and	  traditional	  regional	  security	  regimes,	  such	  as	  the	  Interamerican	  Treaty	   of	   Reciprocal	   Assistance,	   could	   be	   ignored	   by	   the	   United	   States	   during	   times	   of	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crisis.	  	  They	  also	  highlighted	  the	  importance	  of	  submarines	  in	  countering	  maritime	  threats	  as	  a	  major	  ‘lesson	  learned’	  from	  the	  Falklands-­‐Malvinas	  conflict.	   	   	   	  One	   Brazilian	   participant	   predicted	   that	   it	   would	   become	   increasingly	   difficult	   to	  understand	   the	   South	   American	   strategic	   environment	   without	   considering	   the	   role	   of	  China	   and	   the	   role	   of	   competition	   between	   the	   United	   States	   and	   China	   in	   the	   South	  American	  region.	  A	  U.S.	  participant	  added	  that	  as	  China	  and	  India	  become	  bigger	  players	  in	  the	  South	  Atlantic,	  that	  area	  would	  become	  marked	  by	  increasing	  competition.	  As	  the	  two	  compete,	   the	   South	   Atlantic	   would	   become	   less	   secure.	   A	   participant	   from	   outside	   the	  region	  argued	  that	  Brazilian	  officials	  would	  like	  to	  see	  an	  increase	  in	  multipolarity	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  China,	  but	  added	  that	  there	  is	  a	  fear	  of	  the	  uncertainty	  associated	  with	  such	  a	  shift.	  
Brazil’s Nuclear Submarine Program In	   the	   context	   of	   Brazil’s	   perceived	   security	   threats,	   some	   Brazilian	   participants	  raised	   the	   topic	   of	   their	   nuclear	   submarine	   program.	   The	   Brazilians	   clearly	   saw	   this	  program	   as	   a	   centerpiece	   of	   their	   future	   nuclear	   development.	   Some	   U.S.	   participants	  questioned	  Brazilian	  perceptions	  of	   their	  threat	  environment	  and	  whether	  this	   justified	  a	  nuclear	  submarine	  program.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  dialogue,	   it	  became	  clear	  that	  Brazil’s	  continuation	   of	   the	   nuclear	   submarine	   program	  was	   rooted	   in	   a	   historical	   legacy	   of	   the	  parallel	  nuclear	  program	  of	  the	  1980s,	   the	  country’s	  desire	   for	  status	   in	  the	   international	  community,	  and	  the	  Brazilian	  Navy’s	  institutional	  interests.	  	  There	   was	   some	   discussion	   amongst	   U.S.	   and	   Brazilian	   participants	   of	   the	  proliferation	   risk	   posed	   by	   enriching	   fuel	   for	   use	   in	   submarine	   nuclear	   reactors,	   but	  Brazilian	  participants	  noted	   that	   the	  main	  areas	  of	   concern	   (enrichment,	   fuel	   fabrication,	  and	  reactor	  fueling)	  were	  all	  associated	  with	  land-­‐based	  facilities,	  which	  could	  be	  handled	  within	  existing	  international	  safeguard	  regimes.	  They	  also	  cited	  the	  French	  model	  of	  using	  fuel	   enriched	   to	   approximately	   7%	   to	   power	   its	   submarines	   as	   a	   way	   of	   minimizing	  international	   proliferation	   concerns.	   One	   of	   the	   Brazilian	   participants	   with	   direct	  experience	   in	  their	  nuclear	  program	  described	  that	   the	  Brazilian	  Navy	  planned	  to	  build	  a	  land-­‐based	   prototype	   of	   their	   submarine	   nuclear	   reactor.	   This	   prototype	  would	   be	   sited	  within	  a	  mockup	  of	  the	  planned	  submarine	  so	  as	  to	  practice	  operations,	  including	  loading	  and	  unloading	  fuel	  under	  international	  safeguards.	  Providing	  further	  reassurance,	  several	  Brazilian	   participants	   stated	   that	   Brazil	   was	   the	   only	   country	   that	   allows	   international	  inspection	   of	  military	   units.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   one	   Brazilian	   participant	   questioned	   the	  need	   for	  nuclear	  submarines	  at	  all,	   citing	   the	   lack	  of	  a	   cost-­‐benefit	  analysis	   justifying	   the	  acquisition	   of	   nuclear	   submarines	   over	   a	   larger	   fleet	   of	   conventional	   submarines	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	  maritime	  security.	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Role of Domestic Politics in Brazil’s Defense Policy There	  was	  considerable	   consensus	  among	   the	  Brazilian	  participants	   regarding	   the	  limitations	  of	  their	  defense	  capabilities	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  interest	  from	  the	  political	  elite	  and	  the	   public	   in	   defense	   issues.	   Despite	   potential	   increases	   in	   their	   defense	   budget,	   the	  Brazilians	  believed	  their	  capabilities	  were	  still	  quite	  weak	  due	  to	  the	   large	  amount	  of	   the	  budget	   consumed	   by	   salaries	   and	   pensions	   (approximately	   75%).	   Participants	   believed	  that	  this	  deficiency	  undermined	  their	  credibility	  in	  the	  international	  security	  arena	  because	  their	  strong	  diplomacy	  was	  not	  matched	  by	  a	  strong	  defense.	  They	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  they	  believed	   that	   the	   human	   capital	   available	   in	   the	   armed	   forces	   was	   quite	   good,	   but	   that	  defense	  materiel	  had	  been	  neglected	  for	  too	  long.	  	  The	   Brazilians	   also	   observed	   that	   it	   was	   rare	   to	   have	   defense	   and	   security	  discussions	  within	  Brazil,	   both	   amongst	   the	   general	   public	   and	  within	   the	   academic	   and	  policymaking	  community.	  They	  noted	  that	  their	  community	  of	  defense	  and	  security	  experts	  was	  still	   in	  a	  nascent	  stage,	  and	  that	  the	  relevant	  institutions	  in	  Brazil	  and	  South	  America	  were	  far	  from	  robust.	  Brazilian	  participants	  spent	  some	  time	  educating	  their	  U.S.	  counterparts	  on	  how	  to	  distinguish	  concrete	  Brazilian	  state	  policies	   from	  political	   rhetoric.	   It	  was	   their	  view	   that	  nothing	  in	  Brazil	  was	  ‘real’	  unless	  their	  Congress	  had	  passed	  it	  as	  a	  law.	  They	  noted	  that	  the	  recent	  Defense	  White	  Book	  and	  national	  defense	  strategy	  or	  END	  of	  2008,	  while	  important	  first	   steps,	   were	   basically	   executive	   branch	   proclamations	   that	   lacked	   the	   backing	   of	  budgets	  and	  personnel	  that	  could	  only	  be	  provided	  by	  the	  Congress.	  They	  also	  stressed	  that	  treaty	  obligations	  could	  only	  be	  approved	  if	  both	  houses	  of	  Congress	  concurred,	  which	  they	  considered	   to	  be	  a	  high	  bar.	  Nevertheless,	   they	  pointed	  out	   that	  due	   to	  a	   lack	  of	   interest	  among	   politicians,	   many	   security	   and	   defense	   issues	   were	   handled	   and	   approved	   by	   a	  council	  of	  leaders	  in	  Congress	  rather	  than	  by	  the	  two	  chambers	  as	  a	  whole.	  This	  council	  of	  leaders	   had	   to	   weigh	   the	   political	   costs	   of	   various	  mechanisms	   for	   security	   approval	   of	  defense	  and	  security	   legislation,	  making	  the	  process	  highly	  time	  consuming,	  complex	  and	  unpredictable.	  
Conclusion Brazilian	   and	   U.S.	   participants	   both	   agreed	   on	   the	   need	   to	   foster	   an	   emerging	  community	  of	  interest	  on	  security	  issues	  that	  involved	  both	  countries.	  	  The	  Brazilians	  also	  pointed	  to	  areas	  for	  further	  concrete	  exchanges,	  particularly	  on	  nuclear	  safety	  and	  disaster	  response.	  They	  believed	  that	  on	  the	  diplomatic	  front,	   there	  was	  a	  benefit	   from	  examining	  the	  Brazilian	  approach	  to	  international	  diplomacy.	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All	  the	  participants	  stressed	  that,	  as	  a	  next	  step,	  there	  should	  be	  further	  dialogue	  on	  specific	   issues	   related	   to	   international	   security.	   The	   overall	   tone	   of	   the	   workshop	  discussion	  was	  very	  positive,	  open,	  and	  frank.	  Both	  U.S.	  and	  Brazilian	  participants	  stressed	  how	  much	  they	  had	  learned	  from	  the	  two	  days	  of	  talks.	  They	  also	  noted	  that	  such	  events	  were	   important	   to	   furthering	   mutual	   understanding	   and	   help	   fill	   a	   gap	   in	   structured	  dialogues	  between	  U.S.	  and	  Brazilian	  experts	  on	  security	  issues.	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
 
	  
